I. Introduction
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 ("UNCLOS"), especially Part XII, provides a framework for the protection and preservation of the marine environment. It emphasizes the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution. Most of the provisions on the protection and preservation of the marine environment are also customary laws binding all States.
The primary purpose of this paper is to discuss the international legal framework on the protection of the marine environment of straits used for international navigation from vessel-source pollution. This paper elaborates Part XII of the UNCLOS specifically examining the legal effect of Article 233 of the UNCLOS and other related measures like the International Maritime Organization ("IMO") conventions on protection of the marine environment of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. This paper is composed of four parts including a short Introduction and Conclusion. Part two will examine the key conventions relating to the protection and preservation of the marine environment of straits used for international navigation including Part XII of the UNCLOS. Part three will discuss the nexus between Part XII and Article 233 of the UNCLOS.
II. Part XII of the UNCLOS
Part XII of the UNCLOS relates to the protection and preservation of the marine environment. The first article of Part XII of the UNCLOS provides that all States have a general obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment. The employment of the terms 'obligation' and 'shall' in both Articles 192 and 194 respectively shows that the duty relating to protection of the marine environment is an important responsibility so that all States must be committed to achieving this end. 2 Even though the UNCLOS has provided a legal framework, the rules provided are largely general in application and as such, it requires States to devise more detailed international rules and regulations. Article 197 of the UNCLOS reads:
States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment…
Article 211 of the UNCLOS provides the regulations for preventing, reducing and controlling the marine environment pollution from vessels. 3 Like Article 197, Article 211 also provides the duties of States in establishing international rules and standards to prevent, reduce and control pollution that results from shipping activities. 4 It elucidates three types of state jurisdictions on the regulation of marine pollution and the standards of ships; namely, the coastal State, 5 Article 211 (3) of the UNCLOS prescribes States to "establish particular requirements for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment as a condition for the entry of foreign vessels into their ports or internal waters…"; A port State has been defined as "a sheltered place where ships may load or discharge cargo and embark or disembark passengers, which makes use of both natural conditions and artificial installations, and which offers facilities for the movement of passengers and goods by water and land, subject to a special administration to secure this traffic 
A. Port State Jurisdiction
International law dictates that the internal waters of a coastal State are regarded as part of the territory of that State where, unlike the territorial sea, vessels generally have no right of innocent passage to sail through that part of the maritime zone.
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Ships are subject to the territorial jurisdiction and control of the port State when they enter the internal waters or ports of that State. 11 The port State is entitled to take necessary actions against any offending ships that have caused marine pollution in its territorial waters or Exclusive Economic Zone ("EEZ") should the offending ship subsequently enter its internal waters to call at its port.
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The 2010 Pacific Adventurer oil spill incident off the coast of Queensland, Australia, is a notable example to explain the enforcement powers of a port State. 13 DWT general cargo vessel suffered damage, while plying through rough waters generated by Cyclone Hamish. 14 The ship had been holed during turbulence, which resulted in a spill of 270,000 liters of bunker oil into the Moreton Bay area, not far from the port of Brisbane. 15 When the Pacific Adventurer was towed into the port of Brisbane, an investigation was conducted on board the ship and a tort suit was instituted against the four shipping companies and the ship's Master, with each facing a count of discharging oil into the ocean. 16 In principle, the port State has unrestricted jurisdiction to enforce its laws against any ships and those on board within its own internal waters if the internal waters fall exclusively within the territorial sovereignty of the port State. 17 Enforcement measures of a port State include the inspection of vessels visiting its ports to ensure whether they meet IMO requirements regarding safety and marine pollution prevention standards. 18 If the vessels do not meet these requirements, the port State may allow or deny access to any vessels seeking to gain entry into its port. The Prestige oil spill in 2002 is a good example to illustrate this. The tanker Prestige, loaded with 77, 000 tons of fuel oil, was navigating through stormy waters and suffered an accident about 45 miles off the Spanish coast of Galicia. 19 In distress, the tanker was approaching Galicia. Due to the fear of causing severe pollution of the marine environment, however, the Spanish authorities denied her entry into a safe harbor and sent her off-shore in a north-westerly direction. 20 This incident shows that the port State has the power to deny access to any vessel at risk of entailing adverse environmental consequences. The port State also possesses the jurisdiction to take enforcement action against any vessel calling into its ports with regard to the offences against international rules and standards committed beyond the port State's national jurisdiction. 21 has been regarded as an innovative expansion of national jurisdiction because it extends the enforcement powers of regulating the prevention and the penalties for marine pollution incidents to the port State, which had traditionally been left exclusively to the discretion of the flag State.
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B. Coastal State Jurisdiction
When a ship passes through the territorial waters of a State and subsequently enters any of its ports, that State possesses the status of a 'port' State. If a ship merely navigates through the territorial waters of a State without entering any of its ports, that state is regarded as a 'coastal' State. The coastal State has jurisdiction over its territorial sea (the right of innocent passage), to regulate but not to control.
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Article 220 of the UNCLOS provides enforcement jurisdiction 31 for a coastal State to take action against polluting ships at sea, in the form of inspection, detention or by instituting a legal proceeding. 32 The powers in this respect are stronger in the territorial sea than the EEZ of that State. 33 In addition, the coastal State has the power to take action against recalcitrant vessels under the jurisdictional balance, which, based on the practice of international law, leans heavily in favor of navigational interests. 34 This means that coastal States cannot hamper innocent passage unless the vessel is deemed to conduct a threatening act. 35 In that case, pursuant to Article 25(3) of the UNCLOS, the coastal State may temporarily suspend the right of innocent passage for such a vessel. 36 This situation also applies to the States bordering straits.
Unlike the innocent passage regime which can be temporarily suspended, States bordering straits possess just limited powers as they legally have no right to impede navigation under Article 233 of the UNCLOS. More details will be discussed in the following sections.
C. Flag State Jurisdiction
A flag State refers to the State whose flag is flying on the ship. 37 Customary international law indicates that ships are bound by the laws of the flag State. 38 The earliest effort to codify the principle of flag State jurisdiction was undertaken by the International Law Commission through the Draft Articles concerning the Law of the Sea of 1956. It is now governed by Part VII of the UNCLOS. 39 Every State is required to take such measures for ships flying their flag as are necessary to ensure safety at sea. 40 The flag State jurisdiction system has been developed from the concept that vessels were considered a part of the State's territory and that there exists a factual link between the ship and the State in which it is registered, 41 even if the ship is navigating the high seas. 42 This is provided for in Article 92 of the UNCLOS, which reads: "Ships shall sail under the flag of one state only and … shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas."
43
As regards the enforcement jurisdiction, vessels flying their flag or on their registry should comply with any international laws including the UNCLOS on the prevention, reduction and control of vessel-source of pollution of the marine environment. 44 In this context, the flag State also has the power to conduct an investigation of any vessel that would have violated any applicable international rules or standards on the control of vessel-source pollution, irrespective of where 36 Article 25(3) of the UNCLOS provides: "The coastal State may…suspend temporarily in specified areas of its territorial sea the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security." 37 M. kaCheL, partiCuLarLy seNsitiVe sea areas: the iMo's roLe iN It is undeniable that the enforcement of international maritime instruments is often reliant upon the jurisdiction of flag and port States. 63 Certain of these international regulations preceded the UNCLOS. Nevertheless, through Part XII, the Convention has acknowledged the application of these important international regulations to prevent, reduce, and control the marine environment pollution from vessel-based sources. 64 These international rules act as supplements to the UNCLOS as they provide more detailed rules and regulations than are generally established by the UNCLOS. 65 The international rules on the protection and preservation of the marine environment developed almost concurrently with those regarding the safety of navigation at sea. Undeniably, the protection of the marine environment could be promoted through the navigation safety of vessels plying the seas.
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III. Legal Effect of Article 233 of the UNCLOS
Part III of the UNCLOS relates specifically to straits used for international navigation. In any conflict between the rights…of transit passage and the right to protect the marine environment, the freedoms of navigation must prevail.
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Article 233 has confirmed that transit passage is non-suspendable and thus reiterates the position of the UNCLOS in favoring the right of transit passage over the protection of the marine environment of straits.
A. Interpretation of Article 233
Even though Article 233 is a specific provision in the UNCLOS on environmental safeguards of straits, it has deficiencies in this regard. First, the initial sentence of Article 233 provides that Sections 5, 6 and 7 of Part XII of the UNCLOS do not affect the legal regime of straits used for international navigation. These sections contain provisions relating to pollution control and the procedural and enforcement measures for States to take action against recalcitrant ships, respectively. Therefore the exception of Sections 5, 6 and 7 leave States bordering straits without any procedural and enforcement guidelines to be followed. 73 The second part of Article 233 provides that a State bordering a strait may only take appropriate enforcement measures if either a ship has violated the laws and regulations referred to in Article 42, paragraph 1(a) and (b), 74 or a ship is causing or threatening to cause to major damage to the marine environment of the straits. Section 5 of Part XII covers the types of pollution under the UNCLOS, while Article 233 has expressly excluded the application of Section 5 of Part XII to straits used for international navigation. This leaves a gap in the regulatory regime for protecting and preserving the marine environment of these straits, particularly in relation to the kinds of pollution covered by Article 233. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 ("VCLT") provides: "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." 78 In the Nuclear Tests case, the ICJ reiterated that one of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations, whatever their source, is the principle of 'good faith.'Trust and confidence are inherent in international co-operation, particularly when co-operation in many fields is becoming increasingly essential. 79 In the the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case, the ICJ commented that the principle of 'good faith' obliges the parties to apply a treaty in a reasonable way and in such a manner that its purpose can be realized. 80 Taking the ICJ's definition of good faith in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case into consideration, the reasonable way to apply Article 233 of the UNCLOS for its own purpose is to allow States bordering straits to intercept or hamper the passage of recalcitrant vessels. This is because Article 233 was introduced to protect and preserve the marine environment of straits used for international navigation.
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The term 'good faith' is also laid down at Article 300 of the UNCLOS which provides that: "State parties shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this Convention..."
82 However, Article 300 may not legally justify States bordering straits to suspend navigation of any recalcitrant vessels as Articles 42 (1) Article 233 has to be considered discriminatory against states bordering straits, inasmuch as it is precisely their geographical narrowness that creates greater risks of accident which could cause damage to the marine environment. Apart from being unjust, this provision is poorly drafted… 84 With regard to the definition of the term 'major damage,' Nordquist contends that even though the term is not clearly defined, it can be seen as referring to major maritime calamities in the shipping history such as Amoco Cadiz. 85 In addition, Koh suggested two crucial factors: (1) The occurrence of accidents in the concerned strait as a result of a breach of a navigation rule 86 and (2) the extent of the damage that occurred following the type of ships and goods carried. powers of States bordering straits to be very limited, so that transit rights of vessels could not be suspended by utilizing a claim to protect the marine environment. See supra note 11, at 1193 84 Supra note 73, at 180. 85 Nordquist, supra note 1, at 301. 86 kheNg LiaN koh, straits iN iNterNatioNaL NaVigatioN: CoNteMporary issues 162-3 (1982). 87 Id.
to the economic survival of the States bordering them. Therefore, if the views by Nordquist and Koh are put together, 'major damage' could be defined and interpreted as "any forms of pollution caused by navigating vessels that may socioeconomically affect the well-being of the coastal population that benefits directly or indirectly from the economic activities generated from the usage of the straits." Beckman commented on the effect of the 'major damage' to the enforcement powers of States bordering straits as follows: Beckman's interpretation is that until the term, 'major damage' is clearly defined, the powers of States bordering straits to intercept the passage of vessels in straits used for international navigation would remain limited.
Given the ambiguous wording of Article 233, consultations were held among the delegations from the States bordering straits in the negotiation process of the UNCLOS III. At that time, they tried to reach a common understanding regarding the purpose and meaning of Article 233 of the UNCLOS in its application to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. 90 As far as the enforcement powers of States bordering straits are concerned, this definition seems to be the most feasible and is virtually being adopted into practice. These State practices tend to show that States bordering straits have the power to suspend vessels exercising transit passage if they cause major damage to the Straits. Therefore, Kindt's view that the UNCLOS favors transit passage over the protection of the marine environment is accurate, but this may only be the case as long as ships in transit do not cause major pollution of the marine environment of the straits. However, these relatively few instances do not entirely clarify the term, 'major damage,' but it is still debated. In this regards, George has argued that so-called unimpeded transit passage for all ships should be equitably adjusted to logically enable States bordering straits to properly exercise their regulatory and enforcement powers against recalcitrant ships.
117 Because the UNCLOS does not provide a precise definition of 'major damage' transiting vessels is not strictly prohibited to pollute the marine environment of the straits if the damage caused is relatively minor. If the term, 'major damage' in Article 233 is interpreted in a restrictive way, this could be viewed as a violation of Article 192, which provides general obligations of Part XII to protect and preserve the marine environment. Undeniably, the core difficulty is that there is no 114 Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA), Collision Between MT Bunga Kelana 3 and MV Waily in the Singapore Strait (2010), available at http://www.news.gov.sg/public/sgpc/en/media_releases/agencies/mpa/press_ release/P-20100525-1.html (last visited on May 9, 2016). 115 Id. 116 Supra note 1, at 301. 117 George, supra note 6, at 84. which type of straits it applies to. Article 233 of the UNCLOS mentions specifically that States bordering straits may take action against any ships that have breached their marine pollution laws enacted based on the provision of Article 42(1) of the UNCLOS. Article 42(1) states that: "Subject to the provisions of this section, states bordering straits may adopt laws and regulations relating to transit passage through straits…" As this provision is explicitly related to transit passage, Article 233 is understood to apply only to straits used for international navigation where transit passage is applicable.
As global shipping has been steadily rising, the UNCLOS and the related IMO conventions would be more significant in curtailing the risk of marine pollution and ensuring safe navigation at sea. Singapore and Port Klang are among the busiest ports in the world situated along the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. It is therefore crucial to briefly examine the incorporation of the international law provisions on protection of the marine environment of straits into the littoral States' domestic applications.
IV. Conclusion
The UNCLOS is now regarded as the constitution that governs the laws on the protection and preservation of the marine environment. It acknowledges and recognizes the operations of many important international conventions; namely, MARPOL 73/78, COLREGs and SOLAS, all of which were created by the IMO. Part XII of the UNCLOS confers an obligation on all States to devise and formulate international regulations to protect and preserve the marine environment.
The nexus between Part III and Article 233 of Part XII of the UNCLOS is unclear. The language used in Article 233 is ambiguous, to the extent that it can cause confusion in its implementation. Article 233 only allows the littoral States to take appropriate measures against the vessels transiting straits used for international navigation if they have caused 'major damage' to the marine environment of the strait. As a result of the uncertainty in the interpretation of the term, 'major damage,' it is arguable that transiting vessels may indirectly be permitted to pollute the strait if the pollution is minor.
Based on these findings, the authors would conclude the following. First, Article 233 of the UNCLOS is not effective in assisting the States bordering straits to protect and preserve the marine environment of their territorial straits. Second, it is not
